





**DPSH MUN 2022**

**DISARMAMENT AND  
INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY  
COMMITTEE  
BACKGROUND  
GUIDE**

# Letter from the Executive Board



Greetings, Delegates!

We feel privileged and honoured to welcome you all to the Disarmament and International Security Committee at Delhi Public School Model United Nations 2022

We are looking forward to working with you all and ensuring a constructive debate.

We hope that this simulation proves fruitful to you and you take something valuable back from it. We aim at giving you a better and thorough insight upon the working and functioning of The UN and its sub-committees.

We also hope that by the end of the conference you will have a better understanding about the procedures, rules and objectives and that you will be willing to participate in more such MUN's.

We have designed a Background Guide for you to start off your research process. The Background Guide is a major resource for you but should not provide a hindrance in your external research.

The Background Guide will help you get familiar with the agenda and its background but for the committee to progress as a delegate you must carry forward external research. The Background Guide will provide you with very basic and guiding insights.

Do not base off all of your research from this guide.



As mentioned, this is just the basics.

For your external research and background research on your country, you are advised to research like there's no tomorrow!



We urge all members of the committee to take the time to read the background guide and use it as a starting point for their preparation . We urge every delegate to come to the conference with an open mind, ready to meet and work with new people, and actively participate in the debate in the committee, debate and argue solutions and problems and help form a thorough and effective resolution.

The Executive Board looks forward to your presence at DPSH 2022. Happy MUNning and Researching!

Faraaz Uddin  
Shreyank Nandiwada



# Introduction of the committee





The United Nations General Assembly is one of the six important organs of the United Nations (UN), and the primary deliberative, strategy making and representative organ of the UN. Its job is to regulate the financial plan of the UN, get reports from different parts of the UN, make proposals as General Assembly Resolutions, etc. It has additionally settled various subsidiary organs.



Voting in the General Assembly on vital inquiries, in particular, proposals on peace and security, budgetary concerns, and the decision, confirmation, suspension or ejection of individuals is by a 66% share of those present and voting. Procedural matters are chosen by a direct simple majority part. Every nation has one vote. Aside from endorsement of budgetary issues, including appropriation of a size of evaluation, Assembly resolutions are not authoritative/binding on the individuals. The Assembly may make suggestions on any issues inside the extent of UN, with the exception of issues of peace and security under Security Council consideration.

The General Assembly of the United Nations has frequently managed human rights in its resolutions and declarations. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, is an example of a resolution enacted by the UNGA. Be that as it may, such resolutions or statements are of recommendatory nature. Their lawful significance lies in their capacity to reflect standard law, wind up standard law, and to constitute the establishment for future legitimately/legally binding treaties. For instance, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was the reference report for both Human Rights Covenants and the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its key conditions in the interim reflect CIL (Customary International Law).

The greater part of these conventions as well as resolutions are negotiated by the United Nations General Assembly 's Third Committee, the Committee for Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Affairs Committee (SOCHUM). It is one of six Committees subdivided by topics that the General Assembly has called into being to deal with its various assignments.



# Mandate Of Committee



The First Committee deals with disarmament, global challenges and threats to peace that affect the international community and seeks out solutions to the challenges in the international security regime.



It considers all disarmament and international security matters within the scope of the Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any other organ of the United Nations; the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, as well as principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments; promotion of cooperative arrangements and measures aimed at strengthening stability through lower levels of armaments.

The Committee works in close cooperation with the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament. It is the only Main Committee of the General Assembly entitled to verbatim records coverage.

The First Committee sessions are structured into three distinctive stages:

1. General debate
2. Thematic discussions
3. Action on drafts

It is the only Main Committee of the General Assembly entitled to verbatim records coverage pursuant to Rule 58 (a) of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly.



# Agenda

Discussing the security of nuclear weapons with special emphasis on curbing nuclear terrorism

The specific mandate of DISEC is different from the other committees of the General Assembly in that it places its focus on the disarmament and related international security questions faced by the international community. In this way, many of the United Nations' conventions on disarmament and on the use of weapons have originated in DISEC. For example, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty ratified in 1968, as well as the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), followed the suggestion of United States President Eisenhower to the General Assembly to facilitate the safe development of nuclear technology.



Many of the states, as members of DISEC, have been instrumental in the introduction and adoption of the aforementioned treaties and other agreements. Moving forward, DISEC will continue to face complex issues in which the security of the international community is at stake. DISEC will continue to make recommendations to both the General Assembly and the Security Council as it pursues disarmament, peace, and security initiatives to the fullest extent of its mandate.

Most recently with challenges in the denuclearization process of the Korean Peninsula. The international community has also experienced challenges in limiting the further development of nuclear weapons and pursuing good-faith measures for total disarmament, due to a lack of agreement on the way forward and the inconsistent application of existing nuclear disarmament frameworks. Progress in these areas will require additional frameworks and enforcement mechanisms, as well as the universal participation of all NWS.

Nuclear weapons are one of the largest threats to international peace and security. In response to the devastating 1945 nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly adopted resolution 1(I) in 1946, calling for the elimination of atomic weapons. However, between 1945 and 1950, the number of nuclear weapons in the world increased from 2 to 304, and throughout the Cold War, the number of nuclear weapons increased exponentially, reaching a peak of over 70,000 weapons in 1987. While the efforts of the international nuclear disarmament regime have decreased this figure to under 15,000 warheads in 2017, nuclear weapons continue to pose a major international security threat. The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists published their 2018 assessment of nuclear risk and noted that "the risk that nuclear weapons may be used -intentionally or because of miscalculation - grew last year around the globe." UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres also acknowledged the growing threat posed by weapons of mass destruction, and nuclear weapons in particular.

Currently, nine UN Member States possess nuclear weapons, with several other Member States having nuclear weapon-sharing capabilities. According to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT) (1968), a nuclear weapon is an explosive device that releases energy as a result of nuclear fission. While nearly all UN Member States acknowledge that nuclear disarmament is fundamental for achieving international peace and security, nuclear weapon states (NWS) are reluctant to destroy their nuclear stockpiles for strategic, tactical, and security purposes. This lack of commitment and adherence to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime hampers the ability of the international community to achieve complete and total disarmament.

# Agenda





The General Assembly First Committee is mandated with seeking solutions to achieve the complete and total disarmament of nuclear weapons. Although the First Committee has aided in making the nuclear non-proliferation regime one of the most developed aspects of international law, commitment and compliance to both legislative and regulatory frameworks is required in order to sustain the regime.

## The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

A major landmark created by the United Nations to promote nuclear non-proliferation was the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT was created to help limit the expansion of nuclear weapons. It was opened for signing in 1968 and was meant to promote international cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear technology. Today, it is considered a long-term treaty used to further the goal of eventual total nuclear disarmament. This treaty is significant because it is the only legally binding commitment to non-proliferation, having been ratified by all five nuclear weapon states. Currently, 191 parties have signed the NPT, making it the most successful international nonproliferation treaty to date. India, Pakistan, and Israel, South Sudan are the only states that have yet to sign the NPT. The DPRK had withdrawn from the NPT in 2003.

Despite their apparent lack of nuclear development since 1998, India and Pakistan's hostility towards non-proliferation poses a threat to international security because they are not legally bound to limit expansion in nuclear technology. The treaty works in tandem with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which is responsible for safeguarding articles of the NPT. States declare their nuclear capabilities to the IAEA and work cohesively with the agency to verify that their declaration is true. The IAEA inspects countries' nuclear sites and helps to verify states' continuing compliance of the NPT. For example, the IAEA monitors uranium levels to ensure that continued nuclear development is only for peaceful purposes. These safeguards were created specifically to help enforce the treaty and are an example of true effectiveness when making sure that countries are actually undergoing nonproliferation efforts.



# Agenda

## The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

The second major non-proliferation effort was the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). As hostilities were beginning to thaw after the Cold War, the UN founded the Conference on Disarmament (CD), a committee that works closely with DISEC, and began discussing the CTBT in 1992. The CD began addressing nuclear non-proliferation efforts to begin regulating all Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs). The international treaty prohibits nuclear explosions on Earth and established a global monitoring system to track any nuclear explosion whether in air, land, water, or underground. Passing the CTBT was a positive sign that the international community could work peacefully towards stemming nuclear-proliferation.

Negotiations on this treaty continued from 1994-1996, and it was finally submitted to the General Assembly and opened for signing on 24 September 1996. Currently the United States, Iran, DPRK, Pakistan, and China are among 34 states that have yet to ratify the treaty. This is significant, as all of these countries have nuclear weapon programs. In particular, Iran has a history of hostility towards non-proliferation measures, and the country's resistance to ratifying the CTBT is cause for concern for the UN and for this committee. The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) was established in November 1996 as a part of the treaty. Its objective is to ensure that the initiatives in the CTBT are achieved. With help from the international community, the CTBTO has conducted on-site inspections and created an International Monitoring System (IMS) to effectively monitor nuclear explosions. Together, these resolutions have helped effectively curb the threat of nuclear technology, working to ensure international peace and security.

## The Treaty on the Prohibition of nuclear weapons

Nuclear weapons have long been subject to international regulations. The general rules governing the conduct of hostilities (international humanitarian law) rule out the use of nuclear weapons in almost any realistic circumstances. The use of nuclear weapons would violate the rules of distinction (civilians may not be specifically targeted), proportionality (attacks must be proportional to the expected military advantage gained) and precautions in attacks (civilians must be alerted and protected). The 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) prohibits "non-nuclear-weapon states" (states that had not acquired nuclear weapons by 1 January 1967) from acquiring nuclear weapons. It further commits all parties to pursue disarmament and codifies a right to use nuclear technology for civilian purposes. However, the NPT's explicit distinction between "nuclear-weapon states" and "non-nuclear-weapon states" appears to have rendered the treaty "structurally unable to categorically delegitimize nuclear weapons and the practice of nuclear deterrence." Representatives of the nuclear-weapon states often argue that the NPT gives them an enduring right to possess nuclear weapons.

# Agenda

Adopted by the UN General Assembly in July 2017, the Treaty on the Prohibition of nuclear weapons (TPNW) was designed to institute an unconditional norm against nuclear weapons.

Although none of the nuclear-armed states are expected to join the treaty in the near future, supporters of the new treaty argue that the TPNW will help diminish the “prestige value” of nuclear armament and lay the foundation for nuclear disarmament in the future. Delegitimizing nuclear weapons is argued to constitute a necessary, albeit not sufficient, condition for the elimination of nuclear weapons. The TPNW is not intended as a substitute for longstanding disarmament proposals such as the entry-into-force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty or negotiation of a fissile material (cut-off) treaty, but rather as a tool to help create the normative conditions for the pursuit and implementation of disarmament measures in the future

## Existing Nuclear Weapon Free Zones in the World

### The 1996 African Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty

The topic of a nuclear weapon free zone in the area started when the Organization of African Unity stated its interest in the establishment of such a zone in 1964. This was to combat the French testing in the Saharan region, and the growing interest of nuclear weapons for security by the apartheid regime in South Africa. The Treaty of Pelindaba was signed in 1997 and came into effect in 2009. All states in Africa are eligible to be part of the resolution. In 1996, no African Arab state was willing to ratify the treaty until Israel gave up its nuclear weapon program. Algeria, Libya and Mauritius have ratified their treaty since then.

### The 1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean

French nuclear weapon testing in the Sahara in the 1960s and the South African apartheid regime's interest in nuclear arms, led the African states to issue a call for an African NWFZ, which was endorsed by the UN General Assembly in 1961. Brazil was the only Latin American state, at that time, that supported the African NWFZ resolution and proposed a similar zone within its region. The treaty of Tlatelolco is a treaty was passed and signed on the 14th of Feb 1967, and came into force on the 24th of Feb 1969. It was proposed by Costa Rica at an OAS meeting, as other proposals within the OAS regarding this had not been successful. The treaty covers the whole of the Latin American and Caribbean region, including sections of the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, with all the 33 states in the region having signed and ratified the treaty.



# Agenda

## The 1985 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty

Following the nuclear denotation in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the concern over the issue of nuclear weapons grew in the Asian Pacific region. The South Pacific Forum took up the issue in 1975 after New Zealand proposed the formation of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone. The same year, UNGA endorsed the resolution. The Treaty of Rarotonga was opened for signature on the 6th of August, 1985, but entered into force on the 11th of December 1986.

## The 1995 Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty

On the 27th of November 1971, the original 5 members of ASEAN signed the Declaration of an ASEAN zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in Kuala Lumpur. A major component of this was to establish a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the region. With about 10 years of negotiation, the Treaty of Bangkok was signed on the 15th of December 1995 and entered into force on the 28th March 1997.

## The 2006 Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia

The initiative started with Mongolia stating its goal to become a one-state nuclear weapon free zone in 1992. Mongolia also called for the establishment of a regional Nuclear weapon free zone. The first proposal was in 1993 to the UNGA. The treaty of Semipalatinsk was formed in 8th September 2006 and entered into force in 2009. It has been signed and ratified by 5 states.

# International and regional bodies regulating nuclear weapons

## INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

The objective of IAEA safeguards is to deter the proliferation of nuclear weapons through the early detection of the diversion of nuclear material or the misuse of nuclear technology and by providing credible assurance to the international community that States are honouring their safeguards obligations to use nuclear material and other nuclear related items subject to safeguards only for peaceful purposes. The number of nuclear facilities and the use of nuclear material continues to grow. With new nuclear power reactors under construction and a steady growth in the use of nuclear science and technology, the amount of material and number of facilities under IAEA safeguards is steadily increasing. In 2015, the IAEA safeguarded 1286 nuclear facilities and locations outside facilities, such as universities and industrial sites. IAEA inspectors carried out 2118 inspections in the field. IAEA safeguards are an essential component of the international security system. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT) is the centrepiece of global efforts to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. Under the Treaty's Article 3, each Non-Nuclear Weapon State is required to conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. IAEA safeguards are embedded in legally binding agreements concluded between States and the IAEA. These agreements provide the legal basis for the implementation of safeguards. The legal framework for IAEA safeguards consists of a number of elements. These include the IAEA statute; States' obligations under the NPT and treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones; safeguards instruments such as safeguards agreements, protocols and subsidiary arrangements to those agreements; and the decisions of the IAEA Board of Governors.

The IAEA concludes three types of safeguards agreements:

- Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements with non-nuclear-weapon State parties to the NPT;
- Voluntary Offer Safeguards Agreements with the nuclear-weapon State parties to the NPT;
- and
- Item-Specific Safeguards Agreements with non-NPT States.

Each of these agreements may be complemented with an Additional Protocol that includes provisions for information about, and access to all parts of a State's nuclear fuel cycle, from mines to nuclear waste.

A small quantities protocol may be concluded in conjunction with a comprehensive safeguard's agreement. Small quantities protocols are currently available for States that have minimal or no nuclear material and no nuclear material in a facility.

# International and regional bodies regulating nuclear weapons

## Measures under the Additional Protocol

Additional Protocols (AP) concluded with States with comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSAs) equip the IAEA with important additional verification measures that provide for broader access to information about the State's nuclear programme, increased physical access by the IAEA and improved administrative arrangements.

These additional measures include:

- (i) State provision of information about, and IAEA access to, all parts of a State's nuclear fuel cycle, from uranium mines to nuclear waste and other locations where nuclear material intended for non-nuclear uses is present;
- (ii) State provision of information on, and IAEA short-notice access to, all buildings on a site;
- (iii) State provision of information about, and IAEA access to, a State's nuclear fuel cycle research and development activities not involving nuclear material;
- (iv) State provision of information on the manufacture and export of sensitive nuclear-related equipment and material, and IAEA access to manufacturing and import locations in the State;
- (v) IAEA collection of environmental samples beyond declared locations, when deemed necessary by the IAEA;
- (vi) a simplified procedure for designation of IAEA inspectors, the issuance of multiple entry/exit visas and IAEA use of internationally established systems of communications. Under an AP, the IAEA may carry out complimentary access to assure the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities, to resolve a question or an inconsistency relating to correctness and completeness of the information provided by a State, and to confirm the decommissioned status of a facility or location outside facilities (LOFs), such as in hospitals, where nuclear materials are used.

# International and regional bodies regulating nuclear weapons

## UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific (UNRCPD)



The majority of states in Asia and the Pacific have long realized that disarmament and non-proliferation remain indispensable to helping create an environment favourable to peace, security and development. However, the world remains awash with weapons of mass destruction. It is estimated that at the beginning of 2011, nuclear-weapon states possessed more than 20,500 nuclear warheads, more than 5000 of which are deployed and ready for use (SIPRI). Asian and Pacific states have taken seriously the challenge of overcoming obstacles to achieving a world free of weapons of mass destruction. UNRCPD will continue to assist states in Asia and the Pacific to, at their request, fulfil their peace, security and disarmament goals as they relate to WMDs. UNLIREC and UNREC are two other UN regional centers for Latin America and Africa respectively.

## International Court of Justice

Legality Of the Threat or Use of nuclear weapons Advisory Opinion Of 8 July 1996  
Conclusions by the ICJ



- 1) There is in neither customary nor conventional international law any specific authorization of the threat or use of nuclear weapons;
- 2) A threat or use of force by means of nuclear weapons that is contrary to Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter and that fails to meet all the requirements of Article 51, is unlawful;
- 3) A threat or use of nuclear weapons should also be compatible with the requirements of the international law applicable in armed conflict, particularly those of the principles and rules of international humanitarian law, as well as with specific obligations under treaties and other undertakings which expressly deal with nuclear weapons.
- 4) There is in neither customary nor conventional international law any comprehensive and universal prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear weapons as such;
- 5) However, in view of the current state of international law, and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake.
- 6) There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiation leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

# Five Nuclear Weapon States



Despite the effects from the detonation of the hydrogen bomb, the drive to expand governments' nuclear technology capabilities continued at a heightened scale, peaking between the 1950s and early 1960s and continuing through the 1980s. The United Kingdom was the third country to develop nuclear weaponry, working closely with the United States to develop its program at the time. The peaceful nature of the relationship between the two countries allowed for the United Kingdom's program to expand without conflict. On 13 February 1960, France conducted its first nuclear test and became the fourth nuclear weapon state. France developed its nuclear weapons program multilaterally with the other super powers. In 1962, a record number of nuclear tests were carried out across the world. 178 nuclear tests were detonated in the United States and the Soviet Union alone. The rapid proliferation showed an increasing global interest in nuclear technology. These dangerous weapons were becoming more popular, threatening the safety of more people and countries in modern warfare. On 16 October 1964, the People's Republic of China conducted its first nuclear test, making it the fifth nuclear weapon state.

Nuclear weapon states are defined in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as states that detonated a nuclear device before 1 January 1967. These five states to this day are the only ones allowed to legally possess nuclear weapons, but have agreed under the Treaty to work with non-nuclear weapon states in sharing the benefits of peaceful nuclear development. These states are also heavily involved in all non-proliferation efforts. The NPT is the most successful non-proliferation treaty passed by the United Nations General Assembly. It has been the most successful treaty because of the nearly unanimous support it received from the international community. These five states were designated as nuclear weapon states to create as a step toward non-proliferation and have consequently created a legitimate legal force behind non-proliferation efforts, as they are capable of applying economic and trade sanctions against rogue member states that choose to develop nuclear weapons.



# Unofficial Nuclear Programs

## India and Pakistan

In May 1974, India conducted its first nuclear test. Because the United States heavily sanctioned India, the state did not carry out any further tests until the 1990s. India's continuation of its nuclear program was and is still motivated by conflict with Pakistan. Pakistan began enriching uranium for nuclear weapons in the mid-1970s. Both Pakistan and India have been committed to at least match each other in their nuclear capabilities, so as one nation built up their arsenal, the other did the same. In 1998, India conducted five nuclear tests, which led Pakistan to conduct five nuclear tests of its own just fifteen days later. At this point, both states were declared nuclear powers. Although Pakistan has never declared an official nuclear doctrine, in 2002, then-President Pervez Musharraf said, "nuclear weapons are aimed solely at India." India, however, does have a nuclear doctrine which outlines its no-first-use policy and policy of "Credible minimum nuclear deterrence."

## Iran

Iran's nuclear program began in the 1950s, but has progressed slowly. Despite signing the NPT, Iran continued developing nuclear materials in the following decades. In the 1980s, Iranian interest in nuclear weapons surged, as it no longer was involved in a costly war with Iraq. It was not until 2003 that the IAEA began to carry out inspections of Iran nuclear facilities, and asked the state to suspend uranium enrichment. After being generally cooperative with the IAEA and other states for a few years, diplomatic progress stalled when Iran notified the IAEA that it would resume uranium conversion in 2005. Thus, in 2006, the UN Security Council imposed sanctions on Iran. Tensions grew as Iran refused to halt its uranium enrichment programs, leading up to another set of sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council in 2010. Talks about Iran's nuclear program were very difficult, as Iran refused to hold such discussions unless all sanctions were lifted. Finally, in 2015, Iran and the P5+1 powers reached an agreement to curb Iran's nuclear program, called as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The agreement outlines that the United States and European Union will lift sanctions and prevents Iran from highly enriching uranium, obtaining weapons-grade plutonium and covertly attempting to produce fissile material. In January 2016, the IAEA verified that Iran was holding up its end of the deal and maintaining a solely peaceful nuclear program. However, more recently, under the current Trump administration of the United States, they willingly backed out of the deal stating that Iran had not upheld their end of the deal, and it was a bad contract in itself.

# Unofficial Nuclear Programs

## Israel

It is currently speculated that Israel possesses nuclear weapons. Some think that Israel completed research and development during the 1960s, and in 1966 tested its first nuclear weapon. However, Israel has yet to confirm or deny this allegation. Instead, the state has adopted a “nuclear ambiguity policy” and remains non-specific on its nuclear program. The lack of transparency surrounding nuclear technology in the country has been detrimental to its relations with other states in the region. Israel has not ratified major non-proliferation legislation like the NPT, meaning they are under no legal obligations to comply with non-proliferation efforts. Israel’s nuclear capabilities are still a contentious issue and it is pertinent that the committee addresses this when creating a NWFZ in the Middle East. It is this committee’s duty to take measures to try and curb proliferation efforts in order to maintain international security. This committee will focus on non-proliferation efforts in the Middle East, and it is important to consider which countries possess nuclear technology in the region. Nonproliferation efforts will put further pressure on rogue states to limit and eventually dismantle nuclear programs in the country.

Israel, which is not a party to the NPT, maintains a policy of “nuclear opacity,” meaning it refrains from publicly commenting on the potential existence of their nuclear weapons program. United States intelligence operations suspected that Israel was constructing a nuclear reactor as early as 1958. Israel is thought to have assembled its first nuclear weapons in 1967, in the crisis before the Six-Day War. When the NPT was introduced in 1968, Israel did not sign it on account of its nuclear opacity policy, despite pressure from the United States. Israel has continued to increase its nuclear arsenal, and now is suspected to have approximately 80 nuclear warheads, with fissile material for up to 200. Israel has not accepted full-scope IAEA safeguards and rejects the establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East. However, the state has signed the CTBT, although it has not yet ratified the treaty.

## Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

The North Korean government is highly oppressive and has pushed propaganda nationwide to create a powerful anti-American, anti-Western political climate. While Americans may see the Korean War, which never actually ended (a ceasefire was signed in 1953), as the “Forgotten War,” North Koreans continue to perpetuate pro-war sentiments over 50 years later. Some argue that North Korea inculcate children into their anti-Western politics at a young age, citing how children are required to visit a Korean war museum that depicts Americans as markedly malicious to Korean independence. Kim Jong Un, the president of North Korea, seems obsessed with developing an intercontinental ballistic missile in the eyes of foreign governments, but it remains part of his political flex of strength to show his people the country could strike and kill millions of Americans if it wanted. North Korean nuclear escalation with the United States has heightened global fears around the prospect of another international nuclear scare. In a report published on 1 January 2018, North Korea’s Hwasong-15 ICBM had the ability to strike any major political target on earth, with the exception of those in Latin America; every major American and European city is in range of a strike from this missile, which analysts say can likely fly up to 13,000km. While a viable defence against a strike could be to shoot the missile down mid-flight, missile interception systems have been shown to miss their targets. The North Korean government is estimated to possess 60 nuclear warheads, according to American officials, and these claims came to light as the North Korean government began teasing out the idea of attacking the US territory of Guam with missile strikes. American President Trump responded to these threats, stating the United States would respond with “fire and fury” if Kim Jong Un continued to threaten the United States and its territory. The Korean state has no intentions of backing down, despite Trump’s rhetoric. Trump went on record stating, “If the North Koreans were to strike Guam and kill a lot of Americans it would lead to a war which would destroy North Korea, so my guess is this is bluffing on both sides.” In June 2018, Trump and Kim Jong Un had met in Singapore, marking a historic event, and it was for the first time that a sitting US president attended such a summit. More recently, in February 2019, the two of them met again at Hanoi, Vietnam. Although the world was expecting a pleasant outcome, Trump had said that the deal fell apart, because Kim wanted complete sanctions relief in exchange for dismantling their main nuclear site at Yongbyon. However, the foreign minister of the DPRK had stated otherwise.

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is a detailed, 159-page agreement with five annexes reached by Iran and the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) on July 14, 2015. The nuclear deal was endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 2231, adopted on July 20, 2015. Iran's compliance with the nuclear-related provisions of the JCPOA will be verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) according to certain requirements set forth in the agreement. On May 8, 2018, President Trump announced that the United States would withdraw from the JCPOA and reinstate U.S. nuclear sanctions on the Iranian regime. The following is a summary of the timeline and key components of the multi-year agreement.

## Timeline for Implementation

- July 14, 2015, Finalization Day: conclusion of the agreement. Finalization day triggers Iran and the United States to begin domestic review processes of the JCPOA. Iran also begins providing the IAEA with information necessary for the agency to complete its investigation into past activities related to nuclear weapons development.
- October 18, 2015, Adoption Day: 90 days after the passage of the UN Security Council Resolution endorsing the deal (July 20, 2015). Adoption day triggers Iran and the P5+1 to take steps (outlined below) to meet the commitments to fully implement the JCPOA.
- January 16, 2016, Implementation Day: the IAEA certifies that Iran has taken the key steps to restrict its nuclear program and has put in place increased monitoring. The IAEA's report on implementation day triggers U.S., EU, and UN sanctions relief.
- October 2023, Transition Day: Eight years after adoption day (or the IAEA reaching its broader conclusion on Iran's nuclear program, whichever is sooner). Adoption day triggers the UN to lift missile restrictions, Iran to seek ratification of its additional protocol, the EU to terminate all remaining nuclear sanctions, United States to remove certain entities from the sanctioned list, and the United States to seek legislative termination of certain sanctions.
- October 2025, Termination Day: Ten years after adoption day. Termination day terminates Resolution 2231 and the Security Council closes Iran's nuclear file.

## Crux of the deal:

Under the JCPOA, Iran is allowed to import limited quantities of fuel enriched to 20 percent uranium-235 under IAEA monitoring for the TRR (Tehran research reactor). The P4+1 are required by the deal to assist Iran in obtaining the fuel. (JCPOA, Annex I, Section J, Paragraph 60.) If Tehran is unable to purchase the 20 percent material, it could lead Iran to resume enrichment to that level, which poses a far greater proliferation risk than the 3.67-percent uranium-235 limit that Iran is required to abide by for 15 years under the JCPOA.



There are four major nuclear reactor sites in Iran:

## The Arak Site

As a result of the JCPOA, Iran removed the calandria, or core, from the Arak reactor, filled it with concrete, and committed not to undertake any additional work at the site based on the original design. The IAEA verified the removal of the calandria and continues to monitor the reactor site. In addition, Iran committed to modify the reactor so that, when operational, it would produce a fraction of the necessary plutonium for a nuclear weapon on an annual basis.

If China is prevented from fulfilling its contract on the Arak work, Iran may decide at some point to restart construction on the reactor, perhaps based on the original design. If Tehran were to go down that path, it would pose a proliferation risk and provide Iran with a source of plutonium, which when separated, could be used for nuclear weapons. This prevention only comes from the fact that the CNNC(Chinese National Nuclear Corporation) has a global reach, which essentially means that without the US issuing waivers on secondary sanctions, or revoking them, it would be infeasible to expect the CNNC to continue working on the site.

However, once the reactor is converted, it would be more difficult and time consuming for Iran to use it for weapons purposes or to revert back to the original design. Given the non-proliferation benefits of modifying the Arak reactor and the risks of Iran returning to its original plan for the reactor, supporting and allowing conversion efforts to continue clearly serves U.S. interests.

## The Fordow Site

Turning Fordow into a nuclear physics center, reducing the centrifuges at the site, and using a portion of them for stable isotope production serves U.S. and international nonproliferation interests. It significantly reduces the risk that Iran will reconstitute the facility for uranium enrichment and, by having a regular Russian and IAEA presence at the site, it provides greater assurance that if Iran were to begin to transition Fordow back to a uranium enrichment plant, the international community would quickly be alerted to that fact.

The Fordow site has turned into a nuclear physics centre with reduced number of centrifuges.

This site has Russian and IAEA presence which provide a great amount of security assurance, should Iran choose to enrich Uranium at this site. The site is also impenetrable by any conventional military means, essentially meaning that retaining security assurances over this site is crucial to ensuring that Tehran does not go down the lane of producing nukes.

Additionally, the Fordow facility is located within a mountain that would render it nearly impossible to destroy using conventional military means. A military strike is not a viable option for addressing Iran's nuclear program should Tehran exit the JCPOA and resume more troublesome nuclear activities, and it is more likely to incentivize the country to pursue nuclear weapons. But the invulnerability of Fordow to a strike underscores the importance of retaining the JCPOA and preventing the proliferation risk that would come if Iran were to reconstitute uranium enrichment at the Fordow site.

The China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) is the primary entity involved in the Arak

reactor redesign project and the CNNC and Iran agreed upon a contract in 2017 for the initial

phases of the work. However, despite receiving a waiver in November, Iran has raised concerns about the pace of work at Arak, as CNNC reportedly considers the guidance provided by the Trump administration on the waiver to be vague and insufficient. Given CNNC's global reach and ambitions, the company is likely averse to any risk of sanction by the United States and would be unwilling to continue the project without a waiver.

There are additional implications for revoking the waivers beyond the nuclear deal with Iran.

Rosatom, for instance, is involved in a number of nuclear cooperation projects with U.S. entities. If Washington refuses to grant the waivers allowing legitimate work under the JCPOA to continue, Rosatom and others could choose to retaliate by terminating projects with U.S. based entities. That could inhibit competitiveness of the U.S. nuclear industry and adversely impact their operations.

Plans of Iran:

Iran currently operates two reactors, the TRR and the Bushehr reactor, and has ambitious plans to expand its nuclear program for energy generation. Yet Iran lags behind international standards and best practices for nuclear safety and security. Iran is not a party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its 2005 amendment, nor the Nuclear Safety Convention. Iran also does not publish its nuclear regulatory practices, so it is difficult to determine if Tehran is meeting international standards for governing its civil nuclear activities.

Annex III of the JCPOA encourages cooperative work to address these critical gaps on nuclear security and safety, including measures such as strengthening emergency preparedness, training and workshops on nuclear safety and security, the establishment of a nuclear safety center, and assistance to strengthen physical protection at nuclear facilities.

Cooperative work on several of these areas is already underway. The EU-Iran high-level

seminars on nuclear cooperation have begun the initial phases of constructing a Nuclear Safety Center and assisting Iran with updating its regulatory frameworks to reflect international best practices. This work is proceeding and does not appear, at this time, to be impacted by U.S. sanctions.

## USA and the deal:

There have been repeated confirmations from the IAEA over the years on complete compliance of the deal by Tehran. The Agency's genesis was U.S. President Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" address to the General Assembly of the United Nations on 8 December 1953. The U.S. Ratification of the Statute by President Eisenhower, 29 July 1957, marked the official birth of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Regardless of being the ones to establish the agency, the USA had blindsided the reports of the IAEA, and unilaterally withdrew from the agreement in May 2018.

Up until recent developments came into the picture, wherein Mr. Biden had reconfirmed his commitment to the treaty and subsequently Iran would roll back its nuclear program to the limits set by the original nuclear deal, including caps on enrichment, how much material it can stockpile and the operation of advanced centrifuges needed to enrich

## Sanctions:

The US had reimposed oil sector sanctions which are otherwise known as secondary sanctions, which existed in the pre-deal regime. They stated that the deal should not have been made in the first place, since it does not address the production or use of ballistic missiles by Iran.

If the US does not issue the waivers, the United States could effectively penalize foreign entities involved in the nuclear projects for conducting legitimate work required by the JCPOA and endorsed by the UN Security Council in Resolution 2231.

If the United States does not grant a waiver allowing Russia's state-run energy organization Rosatom to continue working at Bushehr and Fordow, it will put Moscow in the difficult decision of deciding between meeting its explicit commitments under the JCPOA and risking either U.S. penalties or to be in violation of the nuclear deal. Considering the hostility of the situation with respect to the Ukraine crisis, there's a competition for balance of power between the two.

## Questions a Resolution must answer/

### Questions to ponder upon:

1. Can a NWFZ be established in the Middle East?
2. Is it possible to have a world without nuclear weapons?
3. How crucial is it to keep such weapons out of the hands of Non-State Actors (NSAs)
4. What are the problems, if any, with the JCPOA?
5. Is it fair for the P5 nations of the UNSC to possess nuclear weapons, while other nations trying to do the same, are looked down upon?
6. What are the loopholes in said treaties and agreements?
7. Is the NPT as successful as it is claimed to be?

Further look into the meaning of sanctions, primary sanctions, and secondary sanctions.

Researching with respect to relevant international law is important.

# Links for further research

1. <https://www.unidir.org/publication/nuclear-risk-reduction-state-ideas>
2. <https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/text>
3. <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/statute.pdf>
4. <https://cd-geneve.delegfrance.org/Text-of-UNSCR-2325-on-Non-Proliferation-of-Weapons-of-Mass-Destruction>
5. <https://cd-geneve.delegfrance.org/10-Text-of-UNSCR-2055-on-Non-Proliferation-of-Weapons-of-Mass-Destruction>
6. <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1977>
7. <https://cd-geneve.delegfrance.org/Text-of-UNSCR-1540-on-Non-Proliferation>
8. <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/984>
9. <https://www.cfr.org/background/what-status-iran-nuclear-agreement>
10. <https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/sc1540/>
11. <https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/8/issue/3/weapons-mass-destruction-and-international-law>
12. <https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/95/095-19960708-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf>
13. [https://www.nashikmun.org/Rules\\_of\\_Procedure%20final.pdf](https://www.nashikmun.org/Rules_of_Procedure%20final.pdf)